CCJ Crisis: 5 of 6 Judges Allege Dictatorial Leadership

For legal practitioners and court administrators, the CCJ's internal rupture is not just regional political theater; it strikes at the heart of panel composition, dissent publication rules, and judicial ethics. The allegation that a court president removed a judge from a case over a dress code dispute, while five of six colleagues decry 'dictatorial' leadership, raises due-process and institutional-integrity concerns that may shape future appeals and original jurisdiction practice.

The Caribbean Court of Justice is facing the most serious institutional crisis in its history after President Winston Anderson issued a detailed public statement on Friday, August 14, 2026, denying that he manipulated judicial panels or influenced the ruling against Guyana's Opposition Leader Azruddin Mohamed, while conceding that he mishandled two other matters that have engulfed the region's highest court. Anderson's statement, carried by News Americas and published in both the Dominica Gazette and the Trinidad Tribune, responds directly to leaked internal emails first reported by the Trinidad Express, in which five of the CCJ's six sitting judges allegedly accused him of 'dictatorial' leadership. The fact that Anderson chose to issue a lengthy written defence rather than remaining silent signals the gravity of the crisis, but it also risks deepening the dispute by confirming that the court is internally divided over his management of cases and judges.

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The second major allegation concerns the removal of Justice Chile Eboe-Osuji from D'Almada v Trinidad and Tobago.

The Mohamed extradition case is the most politically explosive element of the controversy. Anderson described the allegation that he influenced that ruling as 'entirely unfounded and untrue,' arguing that judicial conferences routinely involve spirited discussion, differing legal analyses, and careful consideration of competing views before a final judgment is settled. He insisted that such exchanges are not evidence of institutional disagreement but of judges doing their jobs. Most notably, Anderson asserted that the ruling against Mohamed reflected 'COMPLETE UNANIMITY among all seven judges.' He added that in the Court's Original Jurisdiction, dissenting opinions are never published, describing this as standard practice among international courts rather than evidence of suppressed dissent. For legal observers, this is a critical distinction: the absence of published dissents does not itself prove unanimity, and Anderson's emphasis on unanimity will be scrutinized precisely because the CCJ's original jurisdiction practice makes independent verification more difficult. The leak of confidential deliberations has forced the court to defend both a specific outcome and its internal processes at the same time.

The second major allegation concerns the removal of Justice Chile Eboe-Osuji from D'Almada v Trinidad and Tobago. Anderson acknowledged the removal but claimed it was made 'solely' over a dress code dispute and 'had nothing whatsoever to do with any judicial views of the legal merits of the proceedings.' He announced a structural change going forward: every judge will now be required to sit on every panel unless formally excused. On its face, this is an attempt to eliminate the perception of panel fixing by making panel composition automatic and predictable. However, the fix raises significant practical and jurisprudential questions. Requiring every judge to sit on every panel can strain judicial resources, slow down hearings, and create conflicts of interest or recusal complications in a court that handles both appellate and original jurisdiction matters. It also does not address the deeper problem of how confidential internal correspondence was leaked in the first place, nor does it resolve the broader trust deficit between the CCJ president and his colleagues.